Abstract. We review the well-known relation between Lucas sequences and exponentiation. This leads to the observation that certain public-key cryptosystems that are based on the use of Lucas sequences have some elementary properties their re-inventors were apparently not aware of. In particular, we present a chosen-message forgery for 'LUC' (cf. 
Introduction
The application of Lucas sequences in various branches of number theory is well known (cf. [MI), and their properties have been studied extensively. Applications of Lucas sequences to public-key cryptography, phrased in terms of the equivalent Dickson-polynomials, were proposed and analysed by a series of authors 113; 14; 12; 16; 17; 111. More recently, the system from [13] reemerged, by a different author and in slightly altered form, as 'LUC' (cf. [21] , and later [25]), and was subsequently extended to 'LUCDIF', 'LUCELG PK', and 'LUCELG DS' (cf. [22; 261). The difference between [13] and [21; 251 is that the latter introduce 'messagedependent' keys.
The main selling point of the Lucas-based cryptosystems aa presented in these later publications (cf. [21; 22; 25; 261) is that they are not formulated in terms of exponentiation. This would make them unsusceptible to various wellknown attacks that threaten the security of more traditional exponentiationbased cryptosystems like 'RSA' (cf. [19] ) and 'Diffie-Hellman' (cf. [4] ). This is illustrated by the following quotes from 1211:
This opens RSA to a cryptographic attack known as adaptive chosenmessage forgery. ... LUC is not multiplicative and therefore not susceptible to this attack. and from [22] :
This problem has the advantage that the subexponential algorithms do not appear to generalize to it, so breaking these ciphers is much more expensive. Concerning the first quote, it was shown independently in [2] and [6] that LUC is susceptible to 'existential forgeries', a restricted variant of chosen-message forgeries. LUC seemed to avoid a true chosen-message forgery, however, which is, according to the response to [6] in [23] , 'the most important advance of LUC over RSA'.
Concerning the second quote, LUCDIF and LUCELG would require far shorter key sizes than traditional systems to provide the same level of security. Or, alternatively, with the same key sizes they would provide security far superior to the older systems.
In this paper we address these two quotes. We review the relation between Lucas sequences and exponentiation, and derive some properties of the Lucasbased cryptosystems that the authors of [21; 22; 25; 261 might not have been aware of. As a result, we present a chosen-message forgery for LUC that is more general than the 'existential forgery' referred to above, thus undermining LUC's main advantage over RSA.
Furthermore, we show that LUCDIF and LUCELG are vulnerable to subexponential time attacks4. We do not claim that the security of LUCDIF and LUCELG is threatened by these subexponential attacks to the same extent as RSA or standard ElGamal cryptosystems are threatened by subexponential time attacks. In the latter systems one typically works in groups of order M m, for some integer m. They which one would want to take full advantage of the small subgroup size.
This fact was independently noted by Burt Kaliski, Scott Vanstone, and the authors of [9] . We are grateful to an anonymous member of the Crypto'95 program committee for bringing the latter paper to our attention.
This greater resistance against subexponential attacks, however, might be offset by possible greater speed of the more traditional systems, like RSA, if comparable parameter sizes are used. It is conceivable that one could use substantially larger parameters in RSA, and still attain the same speed as a Lucasbased system with smaller parameters. Naturally, this would affect the relative security of the two systems. Because these considerations depend heavily on implementation details, we do not elaborate. In any case, we conclude that the situation is not as bright for LUCDIF and LUCELG as suggested in [26] , where it is assumed that the best attacks 'may take time proportional to The paper is organized as follows. First we review some properties of Lucas sequences. Next we present LUC and a chosen-message forgery for LUC, and then we discuss the relative strengths of LUG and RSA. Finally, we present LUCELG PK and a subexponential time attack against it. Similar attacks on LUCELG DS and LUCDIF follow immediately.
Lucas sequences
Let P, Q be integers, and let a be a root of z2 -Px + Q = 0 in the field Q(a), Choosing a =
Remarks. Thus the Vk, uk may be seen as the 'coefficients' of the powers of a that may be computed by the above recurrence relations. Knowing wk and uk implies knowledge of ak, which immediately ties the problem of determining k from V k and U k to the discrete logarithm of crk with respect to the base a.
Depending on which view we like to stress we will write Vk(a) or vk(P, Q), and these are related via a = Of the many relations between the uk, V k we derive a few that are relevant for what is to follow. The first lemma deals with the u and v of conjugates, traces and norms of powers.
Lemma 1. With notation as above, for every a and every k 2 0:
Proof. The first and second assertions are immediate from the fact that exponentiation and conjugation commute:
Multiplying this by ak yields (iii).
Proof. Use Lemma l(ii) and (iii).
This shows that Vk for large k can be easily computed since exponentiation can be done by repeated squaring and multiplication. Alternatively, if both sequences are needed, the following lemma can be used.
Proof. Write out the coefficients of (ak)2 and of a(a2k) respectively.
The other relevant relation is most easily formulated in terms of recurrent sequences. It expresses the fact that the coefficients of the powers of a fixed power am can be found from a recursion with parameters depending on am in a simple fashion.
Proof. Let a: be as before; then by Lemma 1. so where P' = v,(P, Q ) and Q' = &*, and thus
In the applications, Lucas sequences are often considered modulo a fixed mod- Oa/p, and hence of +p(a) in Fp2, which we will refer to in section 6.
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Lemma 5. Let a = Then:
and let p be twl odd prime, with ( 9 )
Proof. In Oalp: A message rn is an integer satisfying 1 5 m 5 n -1 with gcd(m,n) = 1. To encrypt a message m meant for some user, one looks up the user's n and e, and computes the encrypted message y = ve(m, 1) mod n -i.e., P is equal to the message, and Q = 1. This computation can be carried out using the recurrence Alternatively, to use LUC as a signature scheme, the user's signature on a message m equals V d ( m , 1) mod n, which can be verified by checking that ve(vd(m, l), 1) 3 m mod n.
Remarks. Our description of the choice of e and d is more general than the message-dependent choices from [21] or [25]; we refer to [21] and [25] for details. We would like to stress that the Lucas function using these message-dependent secret keys and the Lucas function using our choice of d are the same functions, since in both cases the inverse of e I+ v, (m, Q) is computed. In practical circumstances one would probably prefer to use message-dependent secret keys for efficiency reasons [24] , for instance as follows.
Note that t q p ) ( m , (9) (m, 1) mod q, followed by an application of the Chinese remainder theorem. However, no message-dependent d will be used in the sequel, because a message-independent d simplifies the analysis of LUC, and because in this paper we are not concerned with efficiency issues of LUC. This can for instance be done by selecting c, h, and t such that ct = (e-1)/2+eh
(note that e is odd), and selecting b and s such that bs = 1 + ct. It follows that bs -ct = 1, and that bs + d = 1 + 2ct = e + 2eh, so that a = 2h + 1. that LUC is cryptographically stronger than RSA. We have not been able to locate this proof in [2515, and neither have we been able to derive such a proof ourselves. Here we offer some observations that might be pertinent to this matter. Because ade 5 a mod n and u1 = 1, it follows from the second identity in Lemma 4 that ud(P, 1) E ue(vd(P, l), 1)-l mod n.
Thus ud(P, 1) can be computed whenever wd(P, 1) is known. Moreover, the following equation can be shown to hold by induction on k, using the recurrence relations for u k and uk:
In [25: 3.41, however, the authors 'say, with confidence, that LUC is cryptographically stronger than RSA'.
In particular, the above relations show that Pd mod n can be derived once w ( P + P -l , 1) is known. This does not imply, however, that LUG is stronger than RSA. It is conceivable that LUG can only be broken for some particular set of messages, whereas RSA is secure. For instance, it might be the case that v d ( X , l ) can only efficiently be derived from X, e, and n for X for which (e) = (e) = -1, where p and q are the prime factors of n. This would allow us to break 25% of all LUC-cryptograms, but since (l x+x-' 2-4 ) = ({ X-x-1)2) = 1, the method cannot be used in the above manner to break RSA.
We are not aware of any further results in this direction.
LUCELG
In [26] the following cryptographic application of Lucas sequences was proposed.
Public Key System (LUCELG PK). A prime p and the start values P and Q = 1 are published, chosen such that P2 -4Q mod p is a quadratic non-residue, and such that ve(P, Q ) f 2 mod p for any . ! ? less than and dividing p + 1. Every user also chooses a private key 2, and publishes the public key y = vz(P, &) mod p
(cf. Lemma 2 ) .
A message m is an integer satisfying 1 5 m 5 p -1. To encrypt a message meant for some user, one looks up the user's y, chooses a secret k, which will also be an integer satisfying 1 Remarks. Note that it seems essential in this scheme that Q = 1 mod p : the recipient needs to know Qk mod p for the secret value k in order to be able to compute Vkz(P,&) from Ok(P,Q) using the fourth lemma above. This can be achieved by taking Q = 1 mod p ; in [21; 22; 25; 261 it is assumed that Q = 1. The condition that (9) = -1 (which is nowhere explicitly stated in [26] ) guarantees that one is working in the the finite field F,z rather than F,; the latter contains a square root of P2 -4Q if the Legendre symbol equals 1 instead.
In that case the attack described in the next section merely requires a discrete logarithm computation in F,. The recursive relations are still valid, but the order of a in 04 / p will be a divisor of p -1.
A subexponential time attack on LUCELG
Unfortunately, choosing Q = 1 mod p also provides the key to an attack on the proposed system: noting that in this case, enables an adversary to obtain a f k from v k , since it is a root in Other subexponential time methods to compute discrete logarithms in Fp2 can be found in [l; 51. This implies that an adversary can .derive z from y in subexponential time for any user, and decrypt all intercepted messages sent to that user. Alternatively, an adversary can decide only to derive Ic from the intercepted dl , in subexponential time, after which G and thus m follow trivially from y and d2.
Remarks. In [22; 261 an ElGamal-type signature scheme based on Lucas sequences was proposed (LUCELG DS). Since in this system both 2)k and uk are explicitly given, a direct analogue of the discrete logarithm attack on ElGamal (but here in Fpa) applies. Note that the 'double key size' problems of LUCELG DS as mentioned in [26] cam be avoided if one uses Lemma l(iii) to derive f u k from Vk. This would also avoid the serious weakness in LUCELG DS that is pointed out in [8] . Another variant of ElGamal based Lucas functions is discussed in [8] . The security of that system relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in F,.
In [22] a Diffie-Hellman-type key agreement scheme based on Lucaa sequences was proposed (LUCDIF). Since LUCDIF again uses Q = 1, a subexponential attack similar to the one described above applies to it.
